Oracle (Resolution)

Goal: resolve markets and set payouts, via a 3-stage trust progression.

Status

Stage 1 (manual) ✅ — DemoMarket.s.sol operator reportPayouts. Stages 2–3 planned (S6).

Design (3 stages)

1. Manual (S2) — operator EOA calls reportPayouts. All markets, before adapters exist.
2. Chainlink (S6) — ChainlinkOracleAdapter.sol auto-resolves numeric markets ("ETH > $4000 by X").
3. UMA (S6) — UMAOptimisticOracleAdapter.sol for subjective/event markets ("Did Brazil win?").

MEV-resistant settlement (design note)

slow-oracle 정산은 "릴레이어가 언제·무엇을 제출하는가"가 곧 MEV 표면이다. 설계 선택지:

• (a) commit-reveal — 정산 입력 제출을 commit-reveal로 받아 제출 시점의 선행거래(프런트런)를 차단.
• (b) RANDAO (+필요 시 VDF) — 정산 시드/순서를 사후 결정해 "어느 거래가 정산 직전인지"를 예측 불가능하게.
• (c) 경로무관 멱등 claim — 대량 claim은 (market, slot, nullifier)만 검증.

이 조합이 (어제 딥다이브의) storage-proof 입력 검증과 만나면, "무엇을(storage proof) + 언제/어떤 순서로(randomness)" 둘 다 신뢰 최소화된 정산이 된다.

Open questions

• Operator role: single EOA vs multisig (Q-S2.3.4).
• questionId format alignment with UMA (see markets.md).
• MEV-resistant settlement: at which stage to introduce commit-reveal + RANDAO/VDF ordering + idempotent claims (see the design note above).

Features

• Manual oracle (Stage 1)
  • operator reportPayouts (S2)
  • Broadcast-test DemoMarket.s.sol on anvil
• Chainlink adapter (Stage 2, S6)
  • ChainlinkOracleAdapter.sol reads the feed → reportPayouts after endTime
• UMA adapter (Stage 3, S6)
  • UMAOptimisticOracleAdapter.sol via OptimisticOracleV2.requestPrice
• Operator role
  • (you) EOA vs multisig before testnet
• MEV-resistant settlement (design)
  • (you) Decide commit-reveal vs RANDAO/VDF ordering + idempotent (market, slot, nullifier) claims, combined with storage-proof input verification